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When Legal Cultures Collide 1
RICHARD F. DEVLIN

Every society has the tendency to reduce its opponents to caricatures - at least in

imagination - and as it were to starve them. Such a caricature is ... our 'criminal.' 2

Friedrich Nietzsche

The one duty we owe history is to rewrite it.'
Oscar Wilde

Introduction

In this essay, I attempt to consider the juridical significance of the Irish
hunger strike of 1981. I focus on this almost unreal, but tragically too
real, 'event' for two reasons. First, on the basis of the rereading or rep
resentation that I offer in this essay, the hunger strike provides an
opportunity to reflect upon what ,is perhaps the most enduring and
intractable question of social theory: the relationship between structure
and agency. Specifically, it enables us to critically interrogate the aspira
tions and assumptions of a colonial legal structure and the agentic resis
tance of the juridically colonized. The second reason for my interest is
more personal. As I was a law student in Belfast at the time, the strike
has been a key aspect of my formative context and thus a constitutive
part of my identity. In particular, by bringing into sharp relief the rela
tionship between law, domination, violence, and death, the hunger
strike has turned out to be a (not always conscious but pervasive) back-
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drop against which I have constructed both my political philosophy and
my jurisprudence. 4
But I want to tell this story with a different voice from that which usually
predominates in the dominant discourses of the North Atlantic societies.
More precisely, I will filter my interpretation through the insights of both
postmodernism and deconstruction. My purpose will be to consider the
intersections between postmodernism/ deconstruction and nationalism
in order to inquire into the utility of such perspectives in helping to de
centre the hegemony of a dominant - read British - legal discourse and
thereby to create space for the valorization of a marginalized and subordi
nated legal discourse. My claim is that legal knowledge is itself a terrain of
political struggle, and that dominant legal interpretations are only so
because of their superior force, not because of their superior truth.
However, although I will argue that postmodemism and deconstruc
tion enable us to think critically about power, knowledge, truth, history,
self, and language, at the same time, this case study will highlight what
might be some of the weaknesses of postmodernism and deconstruction
in their ability to 'put the dissidents back into history.' 5 In particular, I will
argue that the postmodern focus on texts and epistemology, while abso
lutely necessary, is insufficient, and therefore that it needs to be supple
mented by an emphasis on politics and ethics. My suggestion will be that
those groups - and, in particular, those theorists - in North American
society who espouse the embracement of postmodernism as providing a
means for the achievement of difference and inclusion are excessively dis
cursive in their conception of power, and therefore incapable of ade
quately supporting a sufficiently destabilizing practice. My aim will be to
walk the tightrope between those who posit that postmodernism and
deconstruction are profoundly liberationist6 and those who argue that
they are dangerously conservative.7
My analysis in this essay draws on some key motifs of both postmodern
ism and deconstruction: alterity, otherness, pluralism, simulation, differ
ence, and incommensurability. The essay is divided into three further
sections. In part 2, I apply some of these insights to the events around the
1981 hunger strike by Irish prisoners in British jails in the British-occu
pied north of Ireland to advance the juridically impertinent proposition
that what was at stake was not merely a politically strategic, last ditch act of
desperation, but' (an)other' indigenously Irish legal claim based upon a
subordinated legal culture, the Brehon Laws. Restated jurisprudentially, I
will argue that the hunger strike can be conceived of as a 'jurisgenerative
act. ' 8 In part 3, on the basis of this story, I develop some reflections as to
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the utility of postmodernism and deconstruction for others who aspire to
the legal recognition of difference. My aim here is to resist the tendency
·towards disengagement and politic.ii quietism which may be engendered
by some aspects of postmodernism and deconstruction. Finally, part 4
provides some (in)conclusive thoughts.
The Hunger Strike
A History

)

In this section, I develop a historical reconstruction and juridical revision
of events leading up to and during the hunger strike of 1g81. History, as
every good postmodernist knows, is contingent upon a choice of starting
points and perspectives: it is partial (in both senses of the word) rather
than total. Therefore, it seems to me that we can only fully appreciate the
interpretation offered in this essay if we begin with the early years of what,
colloquially, is called 'this round of the troubles' in Northern Ireland.
In the late 1g6os, inspired by the protest movements in both the United
States and Europe, a coalition of relatively progressive groups came
together in the form of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
(NICRA) to protest the discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ire
land. Although a few members of. NICRA were republicans, the vast
majority of those involved were socialists and liberal democrats..9 In spite
of the fact that the demands of NICRA were essentially reformist, the
local state response was one of unmediated p(?lice repression. 10 Worse
still was the collusion between the repressive_state apparatuses and seg
ments of the loyalist community whereby the former enabled the latter to
embark upon vigilantism and pogroms, which were so widespread that
(prior to the current civil war in 'Yugoslavia') they caused the greatest
relocation of the civilian population anywhere in Europe since the Sec
ond World War. 11
Thus, I would argue it was the atavistic and repressive activities of the
state - both active and passive - which generated the resurgence of the
legitimacy of the IRA, because when the pogroms began the only people
even partially able to defend the Catholic communities were very small
numbers of IRA volunteers who had a few old rifles. 12 With no sign of the
pogroms abating, with the Catholics very much under siege, the British
government acknowledged that the local security forces were so partisan
that they were causing a legitimation crisis for the British state. As a result,
the British government decided to dispatch soldiers to carry out what was,

172

Richard F. Devlin

in essence, a policing function. For a couple of months, there was a hon
eymoon period between the British troops and the nationalist community
- perhaps bred of dependency - but this began to deteriorate because of
the partisan activities of some soldiers in favour of the loyalist communi
ties, a very tentative emergence of military hostility by the IRA against a
reintensified British presence on Irish soil, and, eventually, the imposi
tion of a curfew and house-to-house searches in the (predominantly Cath
olic) Lower Falls area of Belfast in July 1970.
As to the legal system in this period, if people were arrested they were
processed under the extremely Draconian Civil Authorities (Special Powers)
Act. Yet, in spite of this, those processed and incarcerated under the act
were treated as 'ordinary decent criminals' or 'ode's:'
Though tension began to rise in 1970 between the IRA and the British
Army, mostly in the form of rioting, it was not until February 1971 that the
first British soldier was killed in Northern Ireland since the 192os, and
from April forth the IRA began to develop a campaign of bombing.
The response of the British state, at the bidding of unionist politi
cians, 13 was to introduce internment without trial. Three hundred and
forty-two people, all Catholics, many of them without any connection to
the IRA, were arrested in the first raid on 9 August 1971. Within six
months, a total of 2,357 people had been interned, again the vast majority
of them being Catholics. 14 However, rather than being treated as 'ode's,'
the majority were sent to a deserted Second World War air base - Long
Kesh - placed in Nissen huts, and were able to operate as if they were in a
prisoner-of-war camp. In effect, they had 'political status.'
A much smaller number of 'suspects,' who were arrested and actually
processed through the courts, were not placed in these hastily established
prisoner-of-war camps. Rather, they were sent to the 9rdinary prisons and
located in cells with no recognition of the political motivations for their
'crimes' - nor of the fact that they were arrested and processed under the
Special Powers Act. As a result, in mid:June 1972, about thirty republican
prisoners who had been tried and convicted went on a hunger strike and,
by the fourth week, had gained recognition of their 'special category
status.' 15
Internment and political/ special category status created a fundamen
tal contradiction for the British state. On the one hand, Britain prided
itself on being the great fountainhead of habeas corpus. And yet, the
existence of several thousand untried prisoners was an acute embarrass
ment. Thus in 1972, Lord Diplock issued his Reporl of the Commission to
Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities in Northern Ireland, 16
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which was an attempt to depoliticize the republican prisoners by encod
ing them as 'criminals.' A key aspect of this report were proposals to elim
inate the system of internment without trial by creating special juryless,
single:judge courts that would, with the benefit of a 'modified' common
law of confessions coupled with a shift in the burden of proof, be able to
process 'suspected terrorists.' The agenda was to reassert the supremacy
of the rule of law over the politicization of law. Diplock's recommenda
tions were put into effect in the N'()7'them Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act,
1973, in effect creating a conveyor-belt criminal process. 17
But it was soon realized that the Diplock process of criminalization did
not go far enough in delegitimizing the political integrity of the republi
can prisoners because once convicted they were entitled to 'special cate
gory status,' which had been gained by the hunger strike of 1972. As a
result, Lord Gardiner (a former lord-chanceHor) was called upon by the
British government to prepare a report that would further 'rationalize'
the program of criminalization. He duly obliged and, in a report pub
lished in January 1975, proposed that 'special category status' would not
be available to those who were convicted of crimes committed after I
March 1976. 18
Central to the project of the removal of'special category status' and its
replacement with a program of 'criminalization' and 'normalization'
were the elements of cellular rather than group confinement, and the
wearing of prison uniforms. When the first post-March 1st prisoner was
given his uniform in September 1976, he refused it and therefore, being
without clothes, took refuge in his prison blankets. So began the 'blanket
protest.' The response of the British state was to treat this as a breach of
prison rules, and, therefore, the prison governor imposed harsh penal
ties: 'a complete removal of remission; twenty-f�ur-hour lock-up; depriva
tion of mental stimulation of any sort - reading material, newspapers,
books, television, radio, games, hobbies or writing material. This was com
bined with very intimate body searches' 19 and the reduction of visits to
one half hour per month. By September 1977 there were about 16o
republican prisoners 'on the blanket.'
This situation continued with a hardening of positions through to April
1978. At this point, in response to further 'disciplining' in relation to
washing, as well as 'internal searches of the body, deprivation of letters,
removal to punishment cells and beatings of young prisoners,' 20 the pris
oners refused to wash or cooperate in any way with the prison staff. But
the spiral did not stop with this 'no wash protest.' As part of their policy of
non-participation, the prisoners refused to slop out their chamber pots.
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These pots, in tum, became part of the contested process in that they
were frequently kicked over by prison guards in the course of the ongoing
searches. To prevent this from happening, and specifically to avoid the
soaking and soiling of their floor-based mattresses, the prisoners threw
the contents ·of the pots out the windows and under the doors of their
cells, but these were slopped back in by the prison guards. In turn, by the
end of 1978, this led to the 'dirty protest,' in which the prisoners spread
their own maggot-infested excrement on the walls of their cells. By 1979
there were approximately 3 70 prisoners on the 'dirty protest.'
As all the accounts of the hunger strike and the events prior to it indi
cate, it was clear that it was the prisoners themselves_ who were setting the
agenda. 21 And while there was a significant mobilization on the outside to
publicize the conditions, this was not generating sufficient pressure to
force the British government to change its agenda of total criminaliza
tion. In the face of such ox-like indifference of the British government, as
1980 wore on, the prisoners decided that in pursuit of political status they
would resort to a hunger strike to force the government to recognize
their claims. However, the Army Council of the IRA objected to this inten
sification of the protest, and Gerry Adams, as vice-president of Sinn
Fein,22 communicated that the leadership of that organization was 'tacti
cally, strategically, physically and morally opposed to a hunger strike.'23
But in spite of these objections, on 10 October 1g80, the protesters
announced a strike demanding 'as of right, political recognition and that
we be accorded the status of political prisoners.' 24 On 27 October, seven
prisoners went on hunger strike. Bobby Sands was not one of them as he
was given the position of OC in the camp. As the weeks progressed,
despite the facade of intransigence on both sides, a series of secret negoti
ations proceeded through intermediaries. 25 The result was that, as one of
the strikers seemed about to die prematurely on the fifty-third day, the
British government appeared to acquiesce to the prisoners' demands by
issuing a thirty-four-page document which seemed to suggest a step-by
step de-escalation process that would in effect reinstate 'special category
status.' The strike was called off. However, as became apparent over the
next month, the demands were not met and the prisoners felt outmanoeuvred and totally betrayed.
Thus, in January of 1981, Sands took the initiative arid announced that
a new strike would commence. But on this occasion there was a shift away
from the focus on 'political status' to what became known as 'The Five
Demands': the right to wear their own clothing at all times; exemption
from all forms of penal labour; free association with each other at all
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hours; the right to organize their own recreational and educational pro
grams; and full restoration of remission. It was thought that this change in
the rhetoric would provide the British government with greater space to
compromise. 26 The second hunger strike began on 1 March 1981, and the
rest is history. Ten prisoners died before a solution was reached. But in
the course of the fast, Sands - 'the criminal' - was elected to the British
Parliament; Sinn Fein garnered remarkable local political support; and
world attention was focused, not just on the strike, but on the intransi
gence of the British attitude generally to Ireland.
An Interpretation: Fasting as (An)otherjural C/,aim

J

The last several pages have attempted to provide a historical narrative of
events leading up to, during, and after the hunger strike. This section
provides an interpretation of these events, drawing on some of the
insights of postmodernism and deconstruction.
Deconstruction argues that the hierarchical construction of relation
ships is central to logocentric thought. Derrida p9sits that all oppositions
invoke 'a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axio
logically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand.' 27 This is particularly per
tinent for an understanding of the politics (and pretensions) of law. The
point of logocentrism is to attempt to render that which is contingent,
incontrovertible. Thus, within the dominant jurisprudential conception,
law is conceptualized as both different from and hierarchically superior
to politics in that the latter is acknowledged to be contaminated by vulgar
interests, but law is said to be beyond the contingencies of politics.
Thus, in relation to the hunger strike, one reas·on why the British gov
ernment was so keen on the program of 'criminalization' of the prisoners
was to draw on the logocentric legitimacy of law� so as to put the issue of
nationalist claims for self-determination beyond debate, to enforce clo
sure byjuridical fiat. Thatcher made much of this on a visit to Belfast after
the deaths of several of the prisoners: 'Now what I am saying is we will
uphold the law ... I cannot pull solutions out of a hat. I will not depart
from upholding the law .. .'28
As Michael Ryan reminds us, 'the authority of the sovereign's law
depends upon the establishing of unambiguous proper meaning for
words.'29 In Northern Ireland during the hunger strike era, the contested
terms were 'law' and 'criminal.' The republican prisoners, however,
refused to acquiesce in this totalizing trope of criminalization and
attempted to destabilize and invert this hierarchical move by demonstrat-
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ing the inherently political and partisan nature of the legal machinery.
They called into question the rationalistic and progressive self-image of
law, to tell a different story.
One example illustrates these strategies of resistance that sought to
undermine the British state's logocentric ambitions, and law's 'elective
A
self-image.' 30 It was the prisoners themselves (and contrary to the IR
leadership's traditional policy of political abstentionism) who came up
with the idea of proposing Sands as a candidate for the British Parlia
ment.31 His election by over thrity thousand voters not only legitimized
the demands for political status but also gave notice to the Thatcher
regime that a political consciousness cannot simply be re-encoded by
politico-:juridical relabelling. Moreover, and seemingly learning nothing,
when Sands died, the government hurriedly passed the mendaciously
entitled Representation of the Peop!,e Act, so as to prohibit any further prison
ers from fulfilling their democratic mandat<:; in 'the mother of all_ parlia
ments.' But this also failed because in Sands place his election agent
increased the margin of victory by 786 votes. In sum, the British govern
ment attempted to use the law to privilege one ideological perspective;
the prisoners resisted such a move by asserting a_ contradictory claim,
thereby shearing law of its metaphysical privileges. A$ Derrida posits, 'to
deconstruct the opposition ... is first to overthrow the hierarchy.'32
Viewed in this light, deconstruction helps us to destabilize hierarchical
conceptions of the relationship between law and politics, confirming that
law is always and already constituted by politics.
This is not to say, however, that law is just politics. Rather, law is a par
ticular kind of politics, one that commingles express exercises of power
with implied normative visions. To elaborate. Most of the conventional
reviews of hunger striking in Ireland trace back only as far as the practice
had been adopted by the republican movement.33 Such a historical
account identifies the hunger strike with the political ideology of republi
canism. However, this is only a partial account. Hunger striking is not a
recent phenomenon in Ireland. It is not reducible to republicanism. On
the contrary, its roots can be traced back to an ancient, pre-Christian,
Celtic legal code, the Brehon Laws,34 and the practice of cealachan or
troscead, that is, fasting. Cealachan/troscead is a component of the ancient
Irish Law of Athgabhail/Athgaba� which, in common law terms, one could
consider to be analogous to distraint.35 Athgabhail 'is a general name for
every coercion (lit. binding) through which each person enforces his
[legal] interest' 36 invoked, as Ginnell points out, so that 'advantage is
obtained after disadvantage ... truth after untruth, legality after illegal-
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ity, justice after ·injustice ... right after wrong.' 37 Troscead (fasting) is the
performative act that triggers the action in distraint. Stated simply, if .
a person had been wronged by another who was more powerful - for
example, a chieftain, brehon, bard, king, or bishop38 - having given
appropriate notice, the wronged party was entitled to claim distress by
fasting at the door of the wrongdoer. Responsibility for ending the fast
vested in the perceived wrongdoer. If the latter allowed the plaintiff to
starve to death, then the wrongdoer was held responsible for the death
and had to compensate the victim's family.
A central proposition advanced by this essay is that, building upon not
only the political tradition of previous republican hunger strikes, but also
upon the legal tradition of the Brehon Laws, at the margin of the British
state in the H-Blocks, the prisoners rediscovered and reconstituted an
almost silenced countervailing legal regime: The hunger strike, then, was
not simply a last ditch desperate propaganda stunt, which has been the
dominant interpretation. Rather, it was an irruption of an alterior juridi
cal regime, the espousal of a cultural difference, the exposition of a jural
other, the assertion of a legal right.
It is imponant to note how this came about. The agenda of the British
state was to eliminate the foundations of Irish identity, to totally erase
locations of resistance. It realized that internment and the Diplock courts
served to strengthen the integrity and legitimacy of the republican cause.
It recognized that by taking activists from their communities, by impri
soning them through the ideological trope of criminalization, they could
perhaps silence the nationalist 'other.' But, at /the same time, it was
understood by the government that by continuing with'special category
status,' they were allowing the persistence of_ two contradictions within
their policies. First, 'special category status' was simply a euphemism for
'political status' and therefore a discordant acknowledgment that there
may be a certain legitimacy to the republican liberation struggle. Second,
and just as important,'special category status' acknowledged the military
structure of the IRA and allowed free association and control over the rec
reational and educational processes within Long Kesh to accrue to the
military command of the IRA. In other words, the British government
realized that internment and'special category status,' though they tempo
rarily divorced the IRA from the nationalist community, would have the
effect of facilitating the emergence of what Sands would later describe as
the 'politically educated armed guerilla fighter who will not only use his
[sic] political mind to guide his weapon, but to guide and teach his politi
cally undernourished countrymen to steer their own destiny .. .' 39
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Consequently, it was determined by the British that the repression
would have to be intensified. First, in order to undermine the process of
political radicalization fostered in Long Kesh, the 'Republican Univer
sity,' it was necessary to rethink the architecture of coercion so as to
undercut the groupist solidarity that the traditional military-type cage
structure engendered. As a result, there emerged the idea of H-Block
compounds. These were blocks of prison cells constructed in the shape of
an H, with the four wings connected by an administrational cross-bar.
Each block was capable of containing approximately eighty prisoners,
each prisoner to be held in an eight-foot by ten-foot cell. Second, de
radicalization required that both the nationalist community and the
prisoners themselves cease accepting the code/ signifier of 'prisoners of
war' and instead adopt the penal bureaucratic argot of 'ode' (ordinary
decent criminal) o·r 'hac' (honest average criminal).40 It was this quest for
the penal construction of 'the criminal' that generated the Gardiner
Report's emphasis on uniforms, prison work, discipline, and the· curtail
ment of opportunities for association and education.
But at the margins of the British state, almost absented from the domi
nant discourse, almost delegitimized within the nationalist communities,
the prisoners continued their resistance. First, drawing on the significant
increase in the educational aspects of republican tradition in the last
years of 'special category status,' the H-Blocks became both a conduit for
the dissemination of Irish history and a school for reflection on leftist
inspired revolutionary strategies.4 1 Second, and of crucial importa�ce to
this process of consciousness raising, was the switch to the use of Irish lan
guage. This was required because the new cellular structure required that
if the prisoners sought to communicate with each other, they would have
to shout. But shouting in English would, obviously, render their commu
nications accessible to the prison guards. The solution was to encode the
conversations in a modified version of the Irish language that the prison
ers with an earnest humour called 'jailic.' 42 Third, this translation, in
turn, engendered a greater consciousness of Irish history. Of particular
significance was the interrogation of the legal basis of British colonialism
and the rediscovery of the ancient Irish Brehon Laws and, most notably
for the purposes of this essay, the practice of troscead. Thus, having disin
terred what might be called 'a juridical unconscious,'43 the prisoners
could identify Brehon law as a different legal culture.
Consequently, when the announcement of 10 October 198o claimed
that the hunger strike was based on 'a right,' · it was not simply rhetoric.
Not only did the prisoners base their claim on the terrain of political
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struggle, or the republican tradition of self-immolative martyrdom,44
which are the two conventional interpretations. It was also a profound
juridical claim premised upon a subordinated, and therefore ex-centric
but not eliminated, legal culture. Indeed, a recently published interview
with a former prisoner of the hunger strike period indicates this:
With the Gaelic you begin to get back in touch with political and ideological con
cepts. For instance ceolathan, where in the Brehon laws to express a grievance
against an injustice a guy sat outside the wrongdoer's house and starved himself to
death. Now cealachon [sic] had a whole moral import to it that it wasn't a h unger
strike as a protest weapon; it was the legal assertion of your rights. The hunger
strike was a legitimate and moral means for asserting those rights, and it had legal
precedents dating back to antiquity. You found that there was a literature that
was untranslatable from the Gaelic that could never be expressed in the cold
English.45

The peculiarity is that rather than formulating their claim in some
fomialistic and bureaucratic cause of action - a form of encoding or
translation that severs the plaintiffs from their claim - the fasting prison
ers reconstituted their bodies as a jural template so that their claim was,
literally, one of life or death.
To recap. The essentially rehabilitative claim that I have advanced is
that not only is law politically manipulatable, but also that law is, in a
strong sense, culturally contingent; that it is 'local knowledge, not place
less principle.' 46 The hunger strike of 1981 represents and signifies a colli
sion of incommensurable legal cultures in which one - the Brehon
tradition of the disempowered fasting against the empowered - because
of its marginalized status was not encoded or intelligible ('untranslat
able') as such because of the hegemonic ascendency of the common law
juridical psyche. Through the deconstructive supplementary logic of
reversal and displacement, I wish to rehabilitate this almost erased ethico
juridical other, to reconceptualize fasting as a practice ofjuridical decolo
nization, and to posit that the response of the British state in refusing to
recognize this other legal culture is but another form of violence.
The Political Ambivalences of Postmodemism

J

The purpose of this section is to further this interpretation of legal prac
tices, legal institutions, and legal structures through the grid of post
modernism and deconstruction, and to consider the adequacies of these
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modes of analysis, not just as interpretive techniques, but as potential
juridico-social theories.47 Moreover, I propose to consider Derrida's
recent claim that deconstruction is 'revolutionary,' in the sense 'that it
assumes the right to contest, and not only theoretically, constitutional
protocols ... the right to contest established law in its strongest authority,
the law of the State. '48
Although postrnodernism as political philosophy and deconstruction as
critical method49 do not share an identity, there are certain elements of
homology, continuity, and overlap that are of interpretive value. Given its
complex and portmanteau character, postrnodernism is notoriously diffi
cult to get a handle on. This is because it spans a -variety of cultural and
academic fields, has advocates who frequently adopt profoundly incom
patible perspectives, revels in its ephemeral, splintered, and fractured
dynamism, and - as a result of its predilection for being 'post' - is reluc
tant to construct any determinative or homogeneous self-image. Never
theless, in spite of its slipperiness, I do think that it is possible to provide
an account (though not a definition) of postmodernism in which a few
common motifs50 relate to my discussion.
Of particular importance to this essay, especially in connection with its
relation to deconstruction, are the politico-epistemological propositions
associated with postmodernism. First, and perhaps most importantly,
postmodernism' s embracement of alterity · and 'otherness' 5 1 has meant
that'reality' is deprived of its objective foundations, and is re-understood
as flimsy, fragmentary, unstable, heterogeneous, and plural.52 In this
light, 'authenticity' and 'reality' are re-encoded as 'fabrication' and
'simulation. ' 53 Second, and closely related, because our relationships
with reality are socially mediated and constructed, knowledge too is said
to lack any objective non-contingent foundation. Such an interpretive
approach to knowledge is sometimes called 'perspectivism' 54 or 'anti
foundationalism '55 in that it posits that there can be a plurality of mutu
ally incommensurable perspectives offering equally valid interpretations.
Postmodernism dismantles'Truth,' at least with a capital T.::fi Third, post
modernism is so radical in its disassembly and decomposition of conven
tional wisdom that it argues that the very idea of'the individual' or 'the
subject' is up for grabs. It posits that so pervasive are the social structures
and narragves, that we can no longer be confident of the humanist faith
in an essentialist, pre-social, coherent, unified, and autonomous self.
Rather, even the self is constructed to the core. Derrida, for example,
talks about the'death' of the subject, 57 and Baudrillard calls for a 'renun
ciation of the position of the subject.' 58 If postmodernists are accurate in
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this claim, then they obviously problematize our traditionally received
ideas about autonomy, freedom, choice, and agency.59 Finally, according
to Baudrillar4, several political consequences emerge from these socio
logical and epistemological propositions. Most importantly, he argues
that power needs to be reconceptualized. 'No more subject, focal point,
centre or p�riphery: but pure flexion or circular inflection. No more vio
lence or surveillance: only "information," secret with virulence, chain
reaction, slow implosion and simulacra of spaces where the real effect
comes into play.'60 Indeed, because 'power is no longer present except to
conceal that there is none'61 then 'law and order themselves might be nothing
more than a simulation.'62 All of which is to say that 'the political sphere
(and power in general) becomes empty,' 63 so that 'power pure and simple
disappears. '64 As a consequence of this dispersed conception of power,
the idea - indeed the very possibility - of. political praxis needs to be
reconsidered.
Postmodernism and deconstruction share some political motifs. By
highlighting the constructed and necessarily relational nature of that
which would be incontrovertible, the deconstructive technique of dif
ferana endangers and deflates logocentrism. Deconstruction uncovers the
plurality of possibilities and demonstrates that what is centralized is
dependent upon the repression of alternative contenders by relegating
them to the margins. This process of foregrounding contradiction, anom
aly, and irrationality is considered to be empowering in that deconstruc
tion creates the . possibility for dismantling binary oppositions and
revivifying that which has been submerged. Decon�truction creates condi
tions hospitable to the 'return of the repressed.'
Derrida's concepts of 'marginality, supplementarity, differance and
deconstruction'65 have helped me to better reconsider and explain my
own understanding of the hunger strike. In its disinterring and valoriza
tion of 'alterity' - the existence and potential legitimacy of otherness postmodernism also allows space for at least a hearing of alternative and
deviant perspectives. There is, then, an intersection between my analysis
of the hunger strike, and postmodernism and deconstruction.
However, it would be a mistake to confuse intersection with consensus.
There is, of course, an obvious postmodern response to my analysis: that
my argument may tend to privilege consciousness and therefore smack of
a revivalist and revolutionary voluntarism that is dependent upon an ide
alistic and nostalgic humanism. Nationalism, after all, is but a by-product
of modernity and modernist thinking.66 More specifically, the postmod
ernist counter-argument would probably be that the fasting prisoners
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were but the 'effect,' determination,67 'site,'68 or symptom of the various
discourses and structures of Irish republicanism. They were inscriptions
of a deviationist subtext, not authors of their destiny. In this section, I
want to cautiously and critically relate my analysis to those of deconstruc
tion and postmodernism, especially as they are manifested in the work of
Derrida and, more briefly, Baudrillard.
Derrida argues that ' ... the task [ of deconstruction] is ... to dismantle
the metaphysical and rhetorical structures which are at work [in the text] ,
not in order to reject or discard them, but to reinscribe them in another
way.'69 A central step in this process is what he calls 'reversal':
I strongly and repeatedly insist on the necessity of the phase of reversal, which
people have perhaps too swiftly attempted to discredit ... To neglect this phase o�
reversal is to forget that the structure of the opposition is one of conflict and sub
ordination and thus to pass too swiftly, without gaining any purchase against the
former opposition, to a neutralization which in practice leaves things in their former
state and deprives one of any way of intervening effectively. 70

The reinscription that I have suggested is the reverse proposition that
although the hunger strike demonstrated the politics of British law, it also
was an indigenously Irish legal claim, the articulation of what Geertz has
called an alterior 'legal sensibility,' another 'form ofjuristical life.' 71 How
ever, from a postmodernist perspective· such an argument may be exces
sively voluntaristic in that it overinflates the 'creativity' of the prisoners.
Derrida has been particularly explicit in his disparagement of 'the sub
ject.' For example, at one point, he argues that 'the subject' is but 'the
play of linguistic or semiological differance' 72 and, at another, posits that
'the authority of representation constrains us, imposing itself on our
thought through a whole dense, enigmatic and heavily stratified history.
It programs us and precedes us.' 73 More expansively:
... the subject (in its identity with itself, or eventually in its consciousness of its
identity with itself, its self consciousness) .is inscribed in language, is a 'function• of
language, becomes a speaking subject only by making its speech conform - even in
so-called 'creation,' or so-called 'transgression' - to the system of the rules of lan
guage as a system of differances, by conforming to the general law of differana. 14

And, with admirable anti-logocentric consistency, Derrida confesses his
own lack of agency by denying that he chooses interpretations; rather,
'the interpretations select themselves.' 75
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In relation to something like the hunger strike, this espousal of textual
determinism is an attractive thesis in that it seems to explain that which is
apparently so eccentric as to be inexplicable: the self-sacrifice of the self
in full knowledge of the likelihood of death. However, the problems with
an adoption of this deconstructive/postmodernist approach to the ques
tion of the subject are twofold. First, it is insufficiently oppositional in its
politico-juridical orientation; and, second, it potentially reinforces contin
ued oppression.
The first argument against an excessively thin theory of the subject pos
its that, in its best light, postmodernism provides little account of how the
repressed actually determine their condition, make choices, and resist
their oppression. The sort of propositions advanced by Derrida run the
risk of oversimplifying the relationship between agency and structure, of
merely inverting the humanist hierarchy of agency over structure and
therefore simply mimicking it.76 But perhaps this goes too far and what is
required is an intermediary mediation between structure and agency, so
that liberal humanism's ontological fetishization of the sovereign, coher
ent subject is not simply replaced by an excessive and reactive anti
humanism,77 thereby slipping into an anti-theory of agency. There is a dif
ference between: (a) a sovereign conception of the subject, in which the
person is assumed to be unified, rational, and voluntaristic (the liberal
humanist position); (b) a concatenated conception of the subject that,
because of its deterministic arguments, denies the possibility of self-con
stitution in any strong sense, and thereby the possibility of oppositional
strategies (the postmodernist position); and (c) a' situated or embedded
conception of the subject,78 which allows for the possibility of conscious
ness and self-constitution in the context of the matrix of societal and cul
tural influences (my position). In other words, what is required is a
relational and historicized theory of the subject, a relational and histori
cized conception of agency. Such an on to logy envisions the subject as nei
ther the centre of the universe nor a mere concatenation of social forces,
but a subject who is both constituted and constitutive.
There is little doubt that republicanism as a discourse is an important
factor in Irish life, but it is not so determinative or constraining as post
modernists might have us believe. Republicanism in the late 1970s and
early 1980s underwent a significant transition from its classical political
abstentionist and exclusively militaristic form, to a politically participatory
and more social movement. Postmodern methodology enables us to track
this transition by encouraging us to look at the micro-details of this devel
opment. In particular, we would have to analyse the changing subjectivi-
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ties and emerging ideologies of actors such as Gerry Adams79 and Bobby
Sands80 - Irish, Belfast-reared, male, working-class, (a)religious - and the
differences of opinion within the Army Council of the IRA. Most particu
larly, we can learn from 'the comms' that were smuggled out of the H
Blocks prior to, and during, the fast. These are perhaps the classic post
modern deviationist micro-texts in that as much as four thousand words81
could be written with a biro refill tube on one cigarette paper or 'stamped
government property toilet roll.'82 They would then be smuggled to the
outside command structures of the IRA through bodily orifices - them
selves penetratingly surveilled83 - but by means of which the prisoners
themselves determined the cha'nge of direction and future agenda of
republicanism.&! By means of these 'comms,' the prisoners disseminated
an alternative political vision for the IRA and even outlined the most
appropriate strategies of mobilization, from massive postering campaigns
to the standing of fasting prisoners as election candidates.85
To elaborate. As the late 1970s wore on, it became increasingly appar
ent to the prisoners that, despite some outside support, their various pro
tests were not going to change the British state's determination to impose
criminalization, nor generate further support for political status in the
nationalist community. The terrain of struggle was significantly enlarged
when the prisoners - against the wishes of the Army Council - decided
that by means of a hunger strike there could be the galvanization of the
nationalist community around republicanism. In other words, it was
determined by the prisoners that the traditionally sanctified unidimen
sional military campaign on its own would not succeed. But although the
first couple of weeks of the fast expanded the support network, still the
majority of the nationalist community remained leery. The key break
through occurred when it was decided - once again by the fasting
prisoners86 - that the traditional republican position of abstentionism
from political campaigns should be abandoned, and it was proposed to
run Bobby Sands -as the candidate for the British Parliament. This strategy
forced the issue w_ithin the nationalist community as to whether it would
split the vote between the republican Sands and the constitutionalist
SDLP and thereby let the single unionist candidate win. The constitution
alists backed down, · thereby giving the full political stage to Sands. The
result was that on . g April 1981, a self-confessed IRA volunteer was elected
to the British Parliament with 30,492 votes, in effect inverting the crimi
nalization agenda of the British state. Boomerang.
Furthermore, the election of two more fasting prisoners in a general,
election in the Republic of Ireland was crucial to the defeat of the govern-
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ing party, Fianna Fail.87 Finally, the strike and the events around it con
firmed that the traditional republican stance of political abstentionism in
deference to militarism was misconceived and served as a catalyst for Sinn
Fein to participate in subsequent local, general and European elections,
obtaining between 10.2 per cent and 13.4 per cent of the overall vote, or
between 25 per cent to 40 per cent of the nationalist vote in Northern Ire
land.88 The prisoners negated the negation. Resistance though marginal,
suitably engendered, can erupt in phenomenal ways.
My apprehensions about the progressive political utility of deconstruc
tion and postmodernism are intensified when I review some of the more
explicitly 'political work' of Derrida, for he is equivocal as to the political
ramifications of his own project. Because of his anti-theory of the subject,
Derrida seems to be insufficiently attuned to what I would describe the
noisy agency of the subjugated, but not totally erased, subject.
At first blush, it would seem unfair to complain about Derrida's
political progressivism, given that in 1983 he wrote a short essay which
challenged not only apartheid but also the West's complicity in its perpet
uation.89 Moreover, apparently in reply to those who have voiced con
cerns about the political significance of deconstruction, he has argued
(with uncharacteristic clarity) that
what is somewhat hastily called deconstruction is not, if it is of any consequence, a
specialized set of discursive procedures, even less the rules of a new hermeneutic
method, working on texts or utterances in the shelter of a given and stable institu
tion. It is also, at the very least, a way of taking a posi�on, in its work of analysis,
concerning the political and institutional structures that make possible and gov
ern our practice, our competencies, our performances. Precisely because it is
never concerned only with signified content, deconstruction should not be sepa
rable from this politico-institutional problematic and should seek a new investiga
tion of responsibility, an investigation which questions the codes inherited from
ethics and politics. This means that too political for some, it will seem paralyzing
to those who only recognize politics by the most familiar road signs.90

While this seems to be an unequivocal articulation of the political ramifi
cations of deconstruction, it is, in my opinion, vitiated in two ways. First,
the comment lacks any specificity as to what might qualify as a desirable
'position' or constitute an appropriate act of 'responsibility.' The abstrac
tion of the argument renders it indeterminate and therefore potentially
as supportive of oppressive political practices as liberationist political
practices. Second, on what basis are we to justify any 'position' that we
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might 'choose' - or is it that such positions might 'choose' us? - if decon
struction has as its primary purpose displacement and the proliferation of
multiplicity?
Indeed, despite these claims as to the political relevance of deconstruc
tion, on other occasions Derrida has also expressed reservations: 'I must
confess that I have never succeeded in directly relating deconstruction to
existing political programmes.'9 1 But he then proceeds to argue that this
does not require inaction or non-commitment:
But the difficulty is to gesture in opposite directions at the same time: on the one
hand to preserve a distance and suspicion with regard ·to the official political
codes governing reality; on the other, to intervene here and now in a practical
and engaged manner whenever the necessity arises. This position of dual alle
giance, in which I personally find myself, is one of perpetual uneasiness. I try
where I can to act politically while recognizing that such action remains incom
mensurate with my intellectual project of deconstruction.92

And to be fair fo Derrida, it must be acknowledged that Derrida the inter
ventionist has taken some progressive political positions. So, for example,
in 1981 he visited Prague to meet with some dissident intellectuals. For his
troubles he was arrested and jailed for three days. But what did Derrida
. the deconstructionist philosopher make of his experience? As one com
mentator reports, Derrida 'insisted on the difficulty there is in making an
ethico-political gesture (supporting the resistance of the Prague philoso
phers, who demand respect for human rights ... and articulate that with a
philosophy of the subject, the person, individual liberty etc) coincide with
a philosophical labour governed by the necessity of deconstructing pre
cisely such philosophemes. ' 93 Viewed in this light, political prisoners in
British,.occupied Northern Ireland could expect little in the way of intel
lectual support from deconstruction.
Nor is Derrida alone in his quietism, in the retreat from the discussion
of praxis. Baudrillard, too, has suggested that given the pervasiveness of
hyper-reality and hyper-conformity,94 then 'withdrawing into the private
could well be a direct defiance of the political, a form of actively resisting
political manipulation.' 95 For him 'indifference,' inertia, and non-partici
pation are the only available 'counter-strategies' :96 'This revolution by
involution ... proceeds by inertia and not from a new and joyous negativ
ity. It is silent and involutive - exactly the reverse of all speechmaking and
consciousness raising. It has no meaning, it has nothing to say to us.' 97
Yet again, events in the H-Blocks problematize the validity of such asser
tions. It is not that the prisoners have 'nothing to say'; rather, it is that
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they have had 'no say.'98 As pointed out previously, one reason why the
British government chose the cell system of incarceration was to under
mine the collectivism and solidarity fostered in the dormitory-type cages
of Long Kesh. The H-Blocks were originally designed to accommodate
one prisoner per cell, and prisoners, on entering, for the first year or so,
were subjected to a rigorous regime of silence: communication with their
colleagues was prohibited. 99 Such a strategy of isolation and individualiza
tion was tailored to reinforce the project of criminalization. But the pris
oners resisted, both instrumentally and structurally. Instrumentally, they
began to communicate to each other by tapping on the heating pipes,
exchanging 'comms' at the weekly mass (one of the few opportunities for
interaction) , and by gradually reviving the Irish language. Structurally,
because of the nature of the 'dirty protest,' it meant that in otder for the
prison authorities to periodically clean the cells to prevent diseases, one
of the arms of the H had to be kept vacant, so as to shift the prisoners to
that section while the other was being cleaned.100 This, in conjunction
with the very high imprisonment rates generated by the Diplock court sys
tem, created an overpopulation problem for the prison administration,
which was 'solved' by putting two prisoners in most cells and thereby
undermining the original plan for a regime of silence. It was this recon
solidation of collectivism that engendered the group solidarity necessary
to sustain the 'blanket,' 'no wash,' and 'dirty' protests and, eventually, to
plan and pursue the hunger strike. It was only during the fast itself that
the silence re-emerged, for, as one ex-prisoner has put it:
I

The slagging and practical joking stopped during the hunger strike. I minded
Bobby [Sands] saying the joking shouldn't decrease .. But it was dead artificial.
There was no fucking singsongs. We tried but it wouldn't work. Bobby had asked
us not to get into the silence. We were all in mourning for the duration. 101

,.

J

Thus to summarize my first criticism of postmodernism's thin theory of
the subject, I would argue that at the level of theory its conception is so
emaciated (and there is no pun intended) that it is incapable of bearing
the explanatory weight that is imposed upon it. Therefore, it is proposed
that we should see agency and discourse as mutually constitutive. How
ever, we can only understand the degree and extent of that mutuality by
actually studying specific situations in particular politico-historical con
junctures. This is what I have attempted to do by focusing on the fast.
The second problem with the postmodern process of the 'aestheticiza
tion of politics' 102 - that it may be complicit in the continuation of oppres
sion - relates to the potentially legitimizing function that the espousal of
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'hyper-reality' and 'simulation' may accrue to the benefit of those who
wield the predominant political power. Two aspects of Baudrillard' s anal
ysis are worth noting in this respect.
First, Baudrillard, in his celebration of the politics of silence, character
izes the masses as 'dumb like beasts,' 103 but, as I have pointed out, the
imposition of the regime of silence was a central component of the crimi
nalization project of the British state. It was through the articulation of
their humanity, identity, and integrity that the prisoners resisted such
silencing. Second, by portraying the hunger strike as merely a particular
manifestation of hyper-reality, by interpreting it as yet another manifesta
tion of 'ubiquitous simulacra, pseudo-events,' 104 Baudrillard may trivialize
the commitment and political consciousness of the subject hunger strik
ers. Death through starvation for over sixty days is more than simulation;
it is more than game playing; it is more than a spectacle in the politics of
illusion. Death, I would argue, is a powerful act of resistance in which
agency draws on its final resource to transgress against a pseudo
hegemonic politico-juridical regime. 105 In other words, postmodernism
unmodified may suggest too much complicity and not enough critique,
an inability to distinguish between domination and resistance. 1 o6 It may
be accurate to argue we cannot know what the fasting prisoners sought
was true in•any transcendental sense, but that means neither that 'truth ...
[has] ceased to exist,' 107 nor that we should consider subjects as paralysed
by 'the spell of indecision,' 1 o8 nor that we have 'nowhere to go.' 109
In order to escape the relativizing drift and political quandary that post
modernism's embracement of a radical anti-humanism might impose, I
would suggest that we can draw on, but adapt to the present context, the
work of the sociologist Margrit Eichler. In relation to issues of gender,
Eichler argues that in a world based upon (male) domination we cannot
know what (gender) equality might look like, and consequently. we should
refocus our sights on what we do know, inequality, and make our task one
of modifying and minimizing these inequalities. 1 10 Similarly, it can be
argued that although we cannot know what an authentic reality might look
like, we can know those things that are manifestly untrue and so our task
becomes one of minimizing the pervasiveness of these untruths. And, as I
have argued, it is clearly untrue that the fasting prisoners were nothing but
ordinary .criminals. The motivations for their alleged crimes were political;
the modes of their arrests and interrogations were the product of excep
tional powers; their alleged confessions were obtained under precisely
tailored conditions; their trials were specially constructed through the
Diplock process; and their treatment in prison was politically motivated,
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particularly the beatings. 1 1 1 How else is one to explain the fact that between
196g and 198o the prison population increased by almost 500 per cent, 1 1 2
except by acknowledging - as both a former Northern Ireland premier
(Major Chichester Clark) and British secretary of state (Reginald Mau
dling) have done - that the Northern Irish and British states are at 'at war'
with the IRA? 1 1 3 In short, there is a radical discordancy between the jurid
ical construction of the prisoners as 'ode's' and the incontrovertible exist
ence of a specifically tailored legal process that simply cannot fit within the
frame of that legal construct. Thus, it seems to me that if we reorient our
inquiry from the quest for truth to the minimization of untruths, then we
can adopt the postmodern virtue of self-reflexivity and self-consciousness
without necessarily being forced to embrace its vice of being self
undermining.114 As Bernstein, echoing Habermas, points out, 'violence
and distortion may be uneliminable, but they can be diminished.'1 1 5
For some of those who subscribe to postmodernism and deconstruc
tion, my foregoing reflections on law, agency, truth, and death will be
understood as being premised upon a vision - the identity politics of lrish
nationalism - that is subject to the withering gaze of deconstruction.
To elaborate. It might well be argued that insofar as my conception of
jurisprudence converts a 'conception of identity into a ground of poli
tics'116 it is necessarily subject to the deconstructive insight that such a
strategy is dependent on a point of contradiction: in this case, the British
law. Deconstruction, I am likely to be reminded, demands more than a
mere reversal of hierarchy, for that merely reproduces binarism without
subverting the very concept of hierarchy; displacement engenders a mul
tiplicity that cannot be reduced to (nationalist) identity. Thus, the valori
zation of identity - an Irish jural other - reinforces and perpetuates the
very system of domination that it seeks to transgress - British juridical
colonialism - achieving what Schlag suggests is only a 'suicidal reinscrip
tion of precisely the sort of hierarchal dualities ... that deconstruction
seeks to subvert and displace.' 1 1 7 Identities constrain, and therefore what
is required is 'a liberation from identity.'118 Moreover, given postmodern
ism's commitment to anti-essentialism and its embracement of the social
constructionist thesis, the very idea of an Irish identity is but a delusive
artifact, a quaint ethnocentric sentimentality, and therefore incapable of
bearing the juridical weight that I would wish to impose upon it.
In response to these charges, three points might be made. First, I would
want to argue that although I recognize that identity politics are necessar- •
ily incapable of having an essentialist base, that does not mean that they
are unhelpful, and certainly not irretrievably reactionary. Rather, we can

190

Richard F. Devlin

recognize the inevitably artifactual nature of a perspective - and can even
countenance the dynamic nature of such identities - but still operate in a
self-reflexive way on the basis of such identities. Irish republicanism of the
1970s and 198os illustrates this. As I have indicated previously, in the 1970s
and particularly within the 'republican university,' Long Kesh, republi
canism underwent a significant transition from being exclusively militaris
tic and abstentionist in its orientation to being politically participatory
and self-consciously socialist. This transformation of identity was con
firmed at the Ard Fheis (Annual Conference) of Sinn Fein in 1g85, when
the political and ideological leadership of the organization was trans
ferred from the conservative purists of the south ()f Ireland to the leftist
pragmatists of the north of Ireland. To argue that identity has no natural,
essential, or absolute significance, to accept the impossibility of 'a rigor
ously pure self-identity,' 1 19 does not necessarily commit one to the paralys
ing and indifferent claim that identity politics is misconceived. It simply
allows us to recognize that difference and identity are constitutively inter
locking, to be conscious of the inevitability of political change, and to
forewarn us not to expect or impose closure.
Second, and more important, to accept the relentless postmodern posi
tion that the subject is concocted to the core leads, potentially, to a radi
cally individualized politico-ontology. If So, this might well have the effect
of marginalizing the group aspects of our identity, thereby, though per
haps inadvertently, fostering singularity rather than solidarity. As a conse
quence, postmodernism may devalue that a_spect of ourselves that many
value highly: our group membership. 1 20 And for the subordinated, this
experience of group identity may act as a form of empowerment and soli
darity. Once again the H-Blocks provide an example of how solidarity is
achieved through what one commentator has described as 'the solidarity
of collective vocality,' 1 21 that is, Gaelic.
Third, and this is a more negative and clearly strategic argument, it is
not as if identity politics is the 'chosen' terrain of struggle by the disem
powered. In common with many forms of oppression - for example, sex
ism or racism - those who oppress on the basis of nationalism do so, in
part, because of the 'identity' of the other. The 'criminalization' project
of the British government was very much driven by the question of iden
tity; its aim was to efface the nationalist liberation justifications for the
prisoners' alleged acts in order to 'identify' them as 'criminals.' The pro
tests and the fasts were an attempt to reassert their identity and their legal
rights as prisoners of war on the basis of that identity. In short, identity is
a terrain of political struggle that the oppressed simply cannot afford to
abdicate.
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(In )Conclusion
I find myself in a curious situation in this essay. On the one hand, I find
that postmodemism and deconstruction through their critiques of hierar
chy, subordination, and oppression open up the space for the emergence
and even possible valorization of different voices. Yet, on the other hand,
at the very same moment, they may undermine such perspectives by argu
ing that they are but an interpretation with no necessary connection to
reality, truth, or justice, or at least no connection that would make a dif
ference. I only want to go halfway, to acknowledge that postmodernism
can be a form of resistance 122 but without having to purchase its unre
quited guardedness. I want to employ its strategies as a mode of politico
juridical analysis in order to deconstruct Britain's juridical hegemony, in
order to facilitate a reconfiguration of Anglo-Irish relations. As Linda
Hutcheon says of feminist encounters with postmodernism, 'exposition
may be the first step; but it cannot be the last.' 1 23
To maintain this position, to avoid this sense of one step forward, one
step back, it will be necessary to draw a distinction between postmodern
ism as a political philosophy and deconstruction as a method of interpre
tation, to argue an embracement of the latter as a mode of empowerment
does not require a commitment to the former with its eschewal of politi
cal practice and its predilection for relentless sceptical indifference. 124
However, deconstruction, too, will have to be revised, dereified, and
deflated. It must be shorn of its pretensions to be 'a general law,' 1 25 a gen
eralization 'without present or perceptible limit,' 126 or a canonized cog
nate of 'justice.' 1 27 Regardless of what Derrida -' the author - might say, 128
deconstruction itself is probably best understood as a rigorous 129 method
ology that enables us to critically interrogate those propositions that
aspire to be universal, authoritative, and logical; to demonstrate how they
are, in fact, contingent, ambiguous, and arbitrary. Subject to this not
insignificant revision, I therefore agree with Derrida when he quips, 'The
fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news. We may even see in this a
stroke of luck for politics, for all historical progress."3°
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